Christian Ethics and Interracial Marriage, Part 1: Preliminary Definitions

October 12, 2012 Christianity, Ethnonationalism, Family, Marriage, Race, Refuting "Christian" Marxism, The West, Theology, Theonomy Print Page

 

Introduction

A premise which far too many people unquestioningly and unthinkingly accept today is the moral propriety of interracial marriage. Egalitarian propaganda has so efficaciously transformed our minds in the last several decades that even the slightest resistance to it – even a father’s stating a mere preference against it – is deemed the unforgivable sin. But given the historical Christian witness against miscegenation, this Pavlovian moral indignation deserves a new assessment. It deserves an assessment which vindicates the historical Christian belief on these matters, showing how intertwined an anti-miscegenist and anti-racial egalitarian outlook is with the rest of Christian and biblical morality.

The Series’ Overarching Aim

In my previous article on miscegenation, I strove to make the case that interracial marriage has a certain sort of moral presumption (or weight, or preponderance) against it. After noting that the answer to the question can lie anywhere on the continuum between “wrong in all circumstances” and “wrong in no circumstances,” I gave a number of reasons trying to tip the scales further and further towards the “wrong in all circumstances” side, even though I conceded that rare, desert-island scenarios could morally permit extraordinary instances of miscegenation. In that article, I essentially argued that miscegenation is wrong in ordinary circumstances, though I did not explicate very deeply what is meant by that. Therefore, just as David Opperman has contributed some further ethical points on miscegenation as it relates to divorce and polygamy, I would like to extend this argument against miscegenation to defend explicitly a “strong kinist” position, the view that miscegenation is inherently wrong, not merely unwise.1 This aim – to provide good grounds to accept the strong kinist position – will be the primary objective of this entire lengthy series, not merely this article; and another objective, slightly lesser in importance, will be an explication of various principles of Christian ethics. This series, in other words, will not simply cite principles of Christian ethics as they instrumentally bear on the question of miscegenation’s moral status; they will receive further elaboration for the reader’s general edification. (As the title states, a strong weight will be placed on both Christian ethics and interracial marriage.) The first of many of these principles is the idea of an act’s being “inherently wrong.”

Intrinsic Immorality

In my previous article, I mentioned an extraordinary and nigh-impossible scenario to illustrate that there is some kind of circumstance where miscegenation would be permitted, namely, if a man had only two options: an interracial, intrareligious marriage and an intraracial, interreligious one. I ceded that miscegenation would be morally legitimate in that circumstance, but continued to state the irrelevance of that thought experiment to the question of miscegenation’s permissibility in our ordinary lives. Against this concession, however, some zealous pro-white advocates take umbrage at the idea that miscegenation could ever be permissible, perhaps believing that such a concession is a denial of miscegenation’s intrinsic immorality.

While their zeal is appreciated and applauded, it is misguided. Morality by its very nature allows for exemptions in certain circumstances; and this occurs not because God’s law lacks universal validity, but because God’s law accounts for conflicts of moral goods—that is, moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas occur whenever there are, in God’s providence, decisions whose alternatives all have moral reasons opposing them to some extent.2  For instance, imagine a dreadful situation where a killer has taken a mother’s two sons; the criminal then tells the mother at gunpoint that she must choose to save only one of her two sons or else lose them both, and the mother, unfortunately, is entirely unable to fight back. The mother therefore has the very difficult decision of choosing one (or both) of her own sons to die. Such a situation would be a moral dilemma, for moral reasons resist all three of the options (choosing the first son, choosing the second son, and choosing neither) but one of them must be selected. Choosing a child to die is grievously wrong in ordinary circumstances, but it might be permitted in these very dire circumstances.3

To use a better and less ghastly example of a moral dilemma, consider the Hebrew midwives who lied to Pharaoh in order to save their own people’s babies (Exodus 1:15-20). Lying is ordinarily sinful—there is a strong moral presumption forbidding deception—but here is a circumstance where moral reasons even more strongly forbade truth-telling, since it would have led to the babies’ (and their own) deaths. Lying is an act which would be wrong in normal circumstances, but here it is permitted due to overriding moral concerns. Additionally, consider the practice of divorce. Many Christians hold that divorce is permissible only in cases of adultery and abandonment. According to them, divorce is ordinarily wrong—something that God hates (Mal. 2:16)—but it is permitted by these rarer and overriding moral reasons. (Even then, there are more complicated moral concerns to take into account, since it can also be better for couples to reconcile even after adultery or abandonment has occurred.) While Christians might not all apply the language of intrinsic immorality to divorce, they would still certainly refer to lying (and selecting a child to die) as intrinsically immoral. Nonetheless, without denying these acts’ intrinsic immorality, one can posit exceedingly rare circumstances which morally legitimize instances of these intrinsically immoral acts. This is not a contradiction of the idea that some acts are inherently wrong; it is just a clarification of the idea of an act’s being inherently wrong. Similarly, this is not an idea that God’s law contradicts itself; it is just an affirmation that God’s law accounts for all the complexities and interrelations of competing moral goods in all possible circumstances. The possibility of moral dilemmas does not entail that we must sometimes choose between sin and sin—which is awful and blasphemous to suggest, for God could never force us to sin—but it does mean that our moral choices sometimes will be very difficult and strenuous.

These principles should help us to see the coherence and competency of strong kinism: it is not inconsistent to affirm both that miscegenation is inherently wrong and that miscegenation is permissible in extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances. It is not a denial of the sinfulness of interracial marriage to claim that it is sometimes permitted by overriding moral concerns. The same thought process would deny that there is any intrinsic immorality to such obvious sins as lying. It may be that strong kinism is false; it may be that interracial marriage is not inherently wrong—but even if that is so, the permissibility of miscegenation in extraordinary circumstances cannot be cited as proof.

Wisdom and Sinfulness

While the idea of a strong moral presumption against miscegenation can entail both that it is inherently wrong and that it is permissible in extraordinary circumstances, the question remains of what constitutes that moral presumption. What does it mean to say that an action has a moral presumption against it? I will answer this question in depth more in the second installment of this series, but for now it would be profitable to analyze the difference between weak kinists and strong kinists on this point. While strong kinists oppose miscegenation as intrinsically sinful, weak kinists oppose it as unwise (or inconsistent with right reason, or of unsound judgment, or a bad idea). Yet, initially at least, this seems to be a distinction without a difference. For are we not bound by God’s law to act wisely? The Lord is not indifferent to whether we act with sound judgment, but teaches that whatever is not done in faith and good conscience is sin (Rom. 14:23).

There still is a difference, of course, but it is small. Strong kinists hold that the very nature of the act of miscegenation (that is, miscegenation qua miscegenation, or miscegenation considered in itself) is sinful, whereas weak kinists think that a number of harmful or undesirable consequences (e.g., the pain caused to mixed children) usually attend miscegenation—and since it is sinful to engage in an act while cognizant of its harmful risks and consequences, miscegenation is usually sinful. Nonetheless, since Scripture (as weak kinists contend) does not expressly prohibit miscegenation, what constitutes its sinfulness is not something about the act in itself, as strong kinists hold, but merely the negative consequences which often follow. This, it seems, is an adequate formulation of what weak kinists mean when they say that interracial marriage is “unwise”: strong kinists locate miscegenation’s immorality in the nature of the act; weak kinists in its consequences.

Significantly, however, the weak kinist must inevitably articulate his position in such a way that, statistically speaking, miscegenation is often sinful, even if its sinfulness is due only to consequences. Unless the weak kinist means something by “unwise” that is very different from what is ordinarily meant by the word, then he would also agree that the majority of interracial marriages—those including the harmful consequences which normally are concomitant—are sinful. But if this is the case, then the weak kinist and the strong kinist are in great practical agreement. They may disagree slightly on the underlying theory, but they would both agree in condemning miscegenation in practice. Consequently, weak kinists should be unwilling to accuse strong kinists of terrible legalism, as if the strong kinists were grievously adding to God’s law and tyrannizing over a matter of indifference. Even if the weak kinists are right, that simply means that strong kinists go slightly too far in their opposition to the zeitgeist—which should clearly be tolerated by mindful and kind Christian brothers. (And for those who are alienist to the point that they oppose even the rationale of weak kinism, natural revelation should be sufficient to overthrow their error. Who could deny that miscegenation often has harmful consequences?4)

Conclusion

It is important to better dissect the varying positions a Christian can take on this issue, if only because politically incorrect positions will necessarily be placed under the strictest scrutiny. In particular, the permissibility of miscegenation in fanciful and abnormal circumstances does not provide evidence against the claim that it is intrinsically sinful. Anti-kinists who believe they see an invincible disproof, in addition to overzealous anti-miscegenists who believe they see a theoretical weakness, are both mistaken on this point. Circumstantial qualifications are built into God’s law and part of the very nature of morality.

Also important is realizing the rather small degree of difference separating the weak position from the strong one within the kinist camp. While weak kinists may disagree upon the nature of miscegenation as considered purely in itself, they both nevertheless agree that the vast number of interracial marriages in society are formed sinfully. Practically speaking, this is a small disagreement, one which should not sever racially aware Christians in their desire for white advocacy.5 In upcoming articles, nonetheless, I will further outline reasons to accept strong kinism as representative of a robust Christian ethical stance on race.

Footnotes
  1. See “A Proposed Division of Kinist Beliefs” by Generation 5: http://generation5.wordpress.com/2010/07/30/a-proposed-division-of-kinist-beliefs/. ↩
  2. Foolish and deluded university professors will think that the “grayness” of moral dilemmas, where a correct choice can be extremely difficult (or even impossible) to identify, shows the falsity of moral absolutism and the truth of moral relativism. But if moral relativism were true, there would be no such thing as objective morality, and therefore no moral reasons weighing for or against an act in the first place. Instead, the “grayness” of certain dilemmas presupposes principles or reasons which are themselves black and white: moral dilemmas require objective morality. ↩
  3. Note from this dilemma that, sometimes, moral dilemmas could have no singular correct answer. I would contend that the right choice of the mother in this situation would be to select one of her two boys to die, rather than leave them both to perish, as grievously and unimaginably painful as that might be; but I clearly could not say that moral reasons favor the choice of one particular son over another. Hence, this moral dilemma would be truly irresolvable: choosing one of her two sons, rather than choosing neither, would be a moral duty of the mother, but there would be no moral reasons favoring the choice of one son over the other. Most moral dilemmas certainly are resolvable (though, again, involving a difficult choice to make), but moral dilemmas do not necessarily need to be so. ↩
  4. Given most people’s blind acceptance of interracial marriage, a lot of people could! And thus, in an article far later in this series, I will also defend this claim: that great harms proceed from miscegenation. ↩
  5. This point is particularly momentous when the reader grasps that certain notable anti-kinists have, in the past, conceded the reality of race and called miscegenation unwise—all while opposing kinism as satanic heresy! ↩

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About Nil Desperandum

Nil Desperandum is currently a college student in Ohio. His interests include theology, philosophy, and the application of biblical law to society.

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  • quartzy

    I am eager to read the rest of this series.

  • Shotgun

    I’ve always disagreed with the distinction between “Weak” and “Strong” Kinism being drawn on the issue of mixing. I’m sorry to see this distinction being used throughout the Kinist community.

    It strikes me as arbitrary, and seems to make concessions to the Satanists living all around us. To them, anyway, a Kinist’s opposition to race-mixing is of the highest concern (when they consider us at all), so they focus on those issues. Why should we? Additionally, why would a “weak” Kinist want to apply the label “Kinist” to himself anyway? What sort of Kinism would that be?

    We could arbitrarily draw the line between “weak” and “strong” Kinism along any line.

    For instance, If we wanted to slice the pie this way, we could say that those Kinists who believe in the corporate election of the White race are the “Strong” Kinists, while those Kinists who believe in a willy nilly, eclectic racial body of elect, are “weak”.

    Or, a “Strong” Kinist could be someone who believes that the Image of the God in man is only fully attained in whites, while the “Weak” Kinist believes the Image of God is the same for all humanity.

    The list could continue. Why arbitrarily select one of these options and say: “This, henceforth, shall be how the Kinist community defines itself!” ?

    Despite this, I think Nil has done a good job in this article of investigating an ethical topic. For pedagogical reasons, I don’t see why we couldn’t temporarily stipulate a “weak” / “strong” distinction along whatever lines we’d like, in order to make points and clarify issues.

    But I strongly disagree with making it some sort of standard inherent in Kinism itself. (Call those who agree with me, “Strong” Kinists, and those who want the distinction to remain as Gen 5 and Nil have implied it, “weak”, if you’d like. lol).

    • Nil Desperandum

      The point I was making is that a certain conceptual distinction has arisen among racially aware Christians, where some of us have affirmed that miscegenation is unwise (or “not a good idea,” or something similar), while others have affirmed that miscegenation is sinful. Tied to the two sides of this conceptual disagreement are the terms “weak kinism” and “strong kinism,” and therefore, for clarity’s sake, those are the terms I use. It is similar to how I use the word “dog” to describe dogs, even though you could likewise criticize the choice of that word (rather than, say, “rog”) as equally arbitrary. I am simply parsing concepts here, using specific terms as vehicles of those concepts (the ordinary function of language), so criticizing their alleged arbitrariness is unhelpful. Selecting terminology to refer to specific concepts (i.e. defining one’s terms) is how all language works, not some sort of “temporary stipulation,” as you say.

      And I would add that I am not hereby forbidding others to use the same terms in a different way. Perhaps some other article-writer would, for some reason, define the terms differently to communicate some different concept. That’s fine; he could do that if he wanted. Terminology serves the practical function of transmitting concepts from one mind to another (amazing, really), and this is the terminology I’ve selected. To criticize my choice of specific terms for specific concepts as “arbitrary,” simply because any other term/concept pairs could have been utilized, is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of language.

      Moreover, whether you like the conceptual distinction or not, it exists. You can’t really argue with the fact that people can disagree (and have disagreed) over the issue of whether miscegenation is sinful or unwise. Hence I am trying to elaborate on it.

      Now, you may think that the distinction is unhelpful, since it seems to imply that the only thing kinists care about is the moral status of one micro-action of miscegenation — all the while ignoring incredibly important macro-level issues of white dispossession and genocide — but I hope you understand why I would be focusing on miscegenation in an article series on miscegenation. I of course hold that strong kinism and weak kinism involve much more than their particular views on interracial marriage, but when I am trying to parse their specific differences on this one topic, you can expect me not to try to exhaustively describe all the facets of Christian racialism.

      • Shotgun

        If you wanted to stick to the “weak / strong” distinction (measured by one’s view of mixing) then how about you (right now) define for the entire Kinist community, exactly what a “Kinist” is…

        Good luck doing so.

        Once you’ve done so, then your statements about how this community might be divided up, can be examined critically.

        Are you equating “Kinism” with a “racially aware, Christian community that disagrees (for whatever reason) with race-mixing” ? If so, that seems unfair in light of all the work Kinists have done in the past (work that implies that Kinism is, itself, a comprehensive and complex worldview.) It would be a shame to define ourselves in the same way ideological enemies do.

        If, on the other hand, you’re merely stipulating a “weak / strong” distinction to make your point, then as I said above: I’m fine with that. This seems to be your route, since you seem to accept the fact that many distinctions can be drawn in the Kinist community.

        Let’s not make any of these distinctions *THE* defining issue on which we define what a Kinist is (or if one is a weak or strong Kinist).

        • Nil Desperandum

          You allege that I cannot meaningfully make a distinction between weak and strong kinism without first providing some set of necessary and sufficient conditions that perfectly conceptually circumscribe kinism from all things which are not kinism (which is an instance of the Loki’s wager fallacy). But that just seems obviously wrong to me. I don’t need to do that in order to realistically make a conceptual distinction between those who believe that miscegenation is unwise and those who believe it is sinful. That’s like saying that I cannot describe some of the differences between classical and cultural Marxism unless I provide some exhaustive codification of what Marxism is.

          I do think that describing kinists as a “racially aware Christian community that disagrees (for whatever reason) with race-mixing” is accurate as far as it goes, of course. (After all, you would hopefully not say that that description is false.) Kinism can be articulated further, obviously, but that’s not to say that broader or more general definitions are incorrect or deficient. But if that’s true, then what’s your criticism? I’ve made a meaningful conceptual distinction, assigned terminology to the distinction for ease of communication, and will try to make various Christian-ethical points in light of the distinction.

          Is your problem that I am not merely distinguishing between (1) the view that miscegenation is wrong and (2) the view that miscegenation is unwise, but that I am trying to set up this dichotomy in terms of kinism? Would you rather I just try to discuss this disagreement without mentioning kinism at all?

          I seriously do not know what it is to which you’re objecting. You just seem to be splitting hairs about points that are tangential to my article.

          • Shotgun

            You’re correct in your assessment at the end; In my posts thus far, I’ve admitted that I agree with the point of your article.

            In a sophisticated Christian theory of ethics (based on an objective deontological standard), there is the phenomenon of the “gray area” which allows for the possibility of something to be wrong objectively, while not being wrong in all cases. This is an important point and I’m glad you’ve brought it to all of our attention.

            My concern wasn’t with the article specifically, but rather, with the distinction between “Weak” and “Strong” Kinism (where weak and strong are determined according to one’s view of race-mixing). Ever since GEN 5′s article, this usage has filtered throughout the Kinist community (from what I’ve seen), and I think it’s unfortunate.

            It simply cannot be said that one is a “stronger” Kinist if his views lean towards a complete rejection of mixing, and that one is “weaker” in his kinism, if he is less-resolved in his denunciation of it (for whatever reason), without doing an injustice to “Kinism” itself.

            (Though, if we’re drawing those distinctions merely for pedagogical reasons, as I believe you’ve done here, I don’t see anything wrong with them).

            I’m concerned with Kinism itself, being trivialized and having our enemies define (and set the boundaries) of what Kinism is.

            For my part, I have no idea if I’m “weak” or “strong” according to this popular distinction.

            I believe mixing is wrong, because I believe the Scripture teaches that racial nationalism is the normative social order for our people, and when one violates this standard (because one is acting in accord with the trendy, neo-jacobin, marxist principalities), he is sinning.

            Now, what would a “weak” Kinist think? Are weak Kinists not racial nationalists? Or if they are, do they not think racial-nationalism is an important Biblical mandate?

            If they don’t, then I’m not sure what degree they’re even Kinists.

            Anyway, thanks for taking the time to reply.

          • Nil Desperandum

            I suppose someone could fall in the weak kinist camp by believing miscegenation to be unwise, but also believe racial nationalism to be normative. Alternatively, he could believe miscegenation to be unwise while believing racial nationalism to be a merely “good idea” (productive of increased safety and prosperity) though not morally normative. (I myself would argue that racial nationalism is morally normative, and that such a position is good reason to accept strong kinism.)

            But that might be your exact point, Shotgun: if weak kinists can hold differing views on racial nationalism while still officially qualifying as weak kinists, then it looks as if the differentiating factor among kinists is their particular view of interracial marriage, as though that were all that mattered. And I would agree with you that that should not be our central topic of concern. I think the distinction between weak and strong kinism is helpful pedagogically (without being pejorative against weak kinists, either, since the one who articulated the distinctions professes to be one), as you do, though I would not want the distinction to be seen as all-important within the kinist camp.

  • TeresaR

    Do Kinists never find people of other races to be attractive, or is it just that they refuse to act on those feelings?

    • Nil Desperandum

      That question spawns a whole lot of different topics in my mind. I’ll simply answer that it depends from person to person. Some kinists might be to the point where they are so rooted in their moral convictions and natural desires that they do not have any lustful temptations with respect to non-white women at all, despite the fact that they can acknowledge beauty when they see it (similar to how we can acknowledge our sisters as beautiful without having a feeling to act off of). Others probably have less restrained thoughts, but they would still act from moral principle by refusing to act on those thoughts and feelings.

    • quartzy

      Yes, some of them can be. It’s not the end of the world for racially conscious people to notice that beauty is not confined to one race. It’s just a choice that you personally make: “I’m not going to pursue this.”

  • Generation5

    My reason for making a distinction between strong and weak Kinism was to distinguish my views on the matter from some of the more prominent Kinist voices, but it’s gratifying to see others have embraced the term. I described my own position as “weak” voluntarily, as Nil notes.

    Nil has made a compelling case here trying to philosophically unite the weak and strong flavors of Kinism. I’ll note two potential problems with this approach:

    1. Nil takes the position that unwise = sinful, or rather that knowingly acting against wisdom is sinful. From this he derives that nearly all, or all, interracial marriages are sinful. The most obvious objection to this is that many people lack wisdom. I find this to be a common fallacy in the Reformed world, which is full of very learned and literate high-IQ people. They cannot see that the arguments they make, even if correct, cannot be understood by significant swaths of the human general population, the majority of whom have IQ’s < 100. My point is that there are many people, especially in an age when Kinist arguments are marginalized, who lack the wisdom to know better, and lack of wisdom is not a sin. If they lack wisdom, and their families lack wisdom, they cannot knowingly go against it. The solution here is for the law to save people from their own stupidity, kind of like Texas used to ban home equity loans. But for now in these cases we are back to the original divide as interracial marriage being either unwise or sinful.

    2. I explained my version of weak Kinism out of frustration with some Kinists, who despite being good people and in one case a good friend, who made extreme, hard to defend claims that men in interracial marriages should abandon their wives and children, taking the example of Nehemiah as normative. This my wife in particular found shocking, and I think it makes Kinists look bad, almost as if our very strong, and God-given, aesthetic preferences for intra-racial marriages should take precedence over equity and fairness for a man's family. This interpretation of Nehemiah is in my view an error, as he was God's prophet who could receive special non-normative instructions from God for His people (just as Joshua could receive non-normative commands to commit genocide against the Canaanites, without justifying genocide in general). Christians have more explicit instructions in the New Testament to not abandon non-believing spouses, and I can't imagine why God would apply a higher standard to interracial marriages than inter-religious marriages. So there's a second issue of controversy between many weak and strong Kinists, that of what to do with these marriages once established.

    This controversy is somewhat tangential logically, as interracial marriage could always be a sin and also, once committed, not be an excuse for abandonment and divorce, just as inter-religious marriage is always a sin, but also not an excuse, once married, for divorce. We can think of many more examples of sinful actions that would also be sinful to undo.

    As a weak Kinist, I should state that I also support anti-miscegenation laws. A law that is both wise and in accordance with God's law is a good law. Even without considering miscegenation an absolute sin, I can support such laws as a curb on undesirable behavior, just as I might support regulation of gambling or certain drugs, even though neither are inherently sinful, as it does not forbid something God commands nor does it command something God forbids.

    Kinists need to be careful to sound reasonable if we hope to have influence. Marginalized groups often react against their marginalization by taking even more extreme positions. This self-destructive reaction only helps our enemies.

    • Nil Desperandum

      I did not mean to convey that I seek to philosophically unite weak and strong kinism, as if I think their disagreement is merely semantic. The disagreement is indeed substantive. (And I will presuppose this in the rest of the series as I give arguments for strong kinism.) My goal in this first article is to explain how the two are substantively different, even though they have similar practical applications — especially since some of the Facebook anti-kinists have called us heretics while professing that miscegenation can be unwise (!). This provides a foundation on which to lay out more arguments explaining why strong kinism is true, because even if those arguments fail, there is still the practically similar outlook of weak kinism on which to fall back (and their practical similarity is further proven by your commitment to anti-miscegenation laws). My forthcoming arguments for strong kinism are not some kind of “only hope” for kinism as a whole.

      1. I don’t think this is a problem at all for my distinction.
      a.) I’m not that committed to the idea that weak kinists and strong kinists will agree on the percentage of interracial marriages which were formed sinfully. If there are tons of cases of miscegenation which strong kinist principles entail are sinful but weak kinist principles entail are permissible, that would not threaten the integrity of the distinction I’ve made. It still could very well be that I have formulated the distinction properly, and I will still offer arguments in ensuing articles for reasons to accept strong kinism as Christian truth.
      b.) To whatever extent we can realistically mitigate or eliminate the moral guilt of miscegenists according to principles of weak kinism, I think a similar mitigation of guilt could be done according to principles of strong kinism. If an inability to foresee the harmful consequences of an act exonerates someone who engages in that act, then an inability to identify the act’s intrinsic wrongness does the same thing. (And this can happen in degrees.) For example, if it is immoral to lend money at usury, and if someone who has been taught his entire life that usury is entirely permissible (and even beneficial), then he will be exonerated of any guilt for opening a savings account with 0.50% APY. Lending money at usury would still be intrinsically wrong, but his ignorance would eliminate his guilt for it. And since ignorance concerning the foreseeable harms of miscegenation is historically concomitant with ignorance concerning arguments for the intrinsic sinfulness of miscegenation, strong kinists and weak kinists can both justly claim that the moral guilt for those in interracial marriages is reduced. This would not be a claim that only weak kinists can make, and so strong and weak kinists would still practically agree on the extent of moral guilt for miscegenists.
      c.) Yet, while both strong and weak kinists can generally make equally extensive claims about exonerated guilt, I nonetheless hold that it would be improper for us to extend this exoneration that far. Our obligations to act wisely, especially in the momentous decision of matrimony, are very, very solemn and lofty. For example, if a girl had even the fleeting thought, “I wonder if my dad actually wouldn’t want me to be with a black man, but might be afraid to say so,” then she has the moral duty to seek that out. Our obligations are very high, and the fact that many do not execute them (but rather rationalize such thoughts away) is a testimony to the vast sinfulness of mankind, not to our exoneration of moral guilt.

      2. You mention the idea of mixed couples being obligated to split up (whether it’s divorce or annulment). I did not mention this in the article, but for those who don’t know, your blog post explaining the distinctions within kinism (footnote #1) mentions this position as stronger kinism, a position distinct from strong kinism. And that is because, as you mention, it is logically independent of the question of miscegenation’s sinfulness: it could be that miscegenation is sinful but that mixed couples ought not to divorce, just as we can say so with polygamous marriages or interreligious marriages. At any rate, I will address “stronger kinism” and the situation in Ezra and Nehemiah cited for its support later in the series. Such a position is not correct, though I also do not think it is correct simply to write off Nehemiah’s action as an extraordinary instance of positive law.

    • Shotgun

      Two quick points:

      1. If a man marries another man, then later, returns to his natural affections, none of us would suggest he remain married.

      Given
      this counter-example, it seems like the ethics governing a marriage
      (and divorce) cannot be applied across the board, (as Mr. Gen 5 has
      tried to do) but must be considered independently.

      2. I can’t
      imagine strolling through the Pearly Gates one day, and apologizing to
      God: “Sorry Lord, your truth was far too controversial and off
      putting. It made the Satanists not like me. So, I mitigated my
      position to placate them, and kept your truth to myself. We’re cool,
      right?”

      The very idea goes against every fiber of my being.
      Call me naive, stupid, over-zealous, or reckless, but I’ll not yield my
      position, even in the face of a 100 sneering academics.

      On the
      contrary: When someone presents a strong, confident and shocking case,
      the Satanists back down! Present the case with cleverness, style, and
      rhetorical flourish, and *they* will begin placating you! They will
      mitigate their positions!

      I’ve seen it happen time and again in
      my personal apologetic endeavors. No, I’ll not be toning my rhetoric
      down. Someone has to tell the truth to the world. Let the Holy Spirit
      worry about convicting them; I’ll speak my conscience.

      • Generation5

        1. An obvious difference is that gays cannot reproduce. Interracial couples can reproduce, and it’s a pretty extreme position to say that their marriage doesn’t exist in fact. God recognizes the existence of polygamous and inter-religious marriages, both sinful upon formation, contrary to God’s design, and yet forbids them, once formed, from frivolous divorce. I think the fact they can reproduce, and these children are in the image of God and should not be abandoned for their parents’ sin and/or foolishness, is evidence God does recognize these marriages as legitimate once formed. God could have easily separated the races to such a degree that reproduction was impossible or produced infertile offspring like mules, but He did not choose to do this. The idea of a wife and children being abandoned because a white man comes to his senses about race shocks my conscience, and intuitively I know that can’t be right. Aren’t you the guy who advocates the primacy of intuition over reason on fundamental issues?

        2. I am not advocating that people, especially in a primary source forum like F&H, water down their genuine beliefs. What I object to is saying shocking things (at least to most audiences) in the most shocking manner possible without a thorough and reasonable argument.

        Shotgun, I’m not familiar with your writing so I’m not criticizing you here.

        • Shotgun

          In reply to 1:

          It’s conceivable that either now or in the very near future, science will have progressed to a degree that homosexuals are able to have children, and then, given your position here, you’ll have to accept the marriage as legitimate.

          But, this would be absurd, and we all know it. I think you’ve arbitrarily decided that mixed marriages should not be annulled (even though, we actually do have Biblical evidence of this being required).

          Further, our pagan state concerns itself in the process of marriage, when the marriage involves a national to a non-national. There are laws governing how this process is to take place (if at all). We can’t just willy-nilly marry a foreigner and if we do so without going through the correct process, we may very well face separation from our spouse and an annulment of all legal recognition of the marriage.

          Why should God be less concerned with mixed marriages than a pagan state?

          Concerning 2: I appreciate the clarification, and I didn’t mean to make it sound like I thought you were talking to me personally. I hear your bit of advice often from people (though, I confess, I never like the spirit of it). I meant to reply to this in general.

        • quartzy

          I think you make good points. One thing I would point out though, is that interracial marriages have increased and the racial boundaries have weakened in concert with the homosexual movement. I do not think this is a coincidence and it can’t be a good sign.

          As far as God recognizing the legitimacy of those marriages, that may be so, but that does not make it wise. God also allows us to be bound by the rulings of the state, though by no means does that mean the state or its rulers always make good, let alone divinely inspired laws.

  • Wayne

    Allow me to take a stab at why most conservative old-time Christians recoiled at interracial couples. The reason is that the spirit behind the coupling is, probably in the very vast majority of times, is one of rebellion, pride, lust and self-centered ego, and often down right disrespect vice true Christian virtue.
    There was a case a while back of a small church in Eastern Ky that refused to marry a long time member who came back from college with a black man. Of course the church was lambasted by the msm, but on close inspection one may ask “If you grew up in that church and know that race-mixing was offensive to your brothers and sisters in Christ (whether right or wrong), and if you loved those people, why did you smear it in their faces?” Answer: because she felt morally superior because of it and wanted to cause the church grief.

    • Richard

      Good comment.

      I remember that story.

      And unfortunately the church apologized (I think.)

      I wouldn’t be surprised if the couple knew in advance that they would be rejected and did it anyway so they could take their story to the media.

      Anyway, thanks to this great website and all the people who support it.

      • Richard

        I want to add something to my comment above, the one from two days ago.

        And that is…

        It might not be my place to speculate about the intentions of the interracial couple in that story.

        Anyway, I like saying “thank you” to everyone who helps make this site what it is. So I’ll say it again — thanks.

        And my gratitude definitely extends to the people who merely visit.

    • http://twitter.com/Weelittlefishy Hyphenated American

      She was vindictive and called the media knowing it would cause an avalanche of death threats. The woman is grossly self-centered in a very extreme sense, empowered by the white-hating radical left.

  • civil rights apostate

    I don’t know whether interracial marriage is wrong, although I think it’s certainly unwise. Now certainly, I will never marry a non-white, even if she is a believer. I will also encourage my children to marry within their race. I abhor the idea of all races being melted into one, but also the idea of a man and a woman being told they can’t be married anymore. (Although I know you don’t support that idea.) There are some nice interracial couples that are very hard to consider sinful, but if everyone miscegenated, that would be awful. It is possible, however, that I am being somewhat inconsistent about mixing. I see no explicit verse in the Bible against transsexualism, (which I think is absolutely disgusting either way) but I believe it is wrong because the Bible explicitly opposes cross dressing (Deuteronomy 20:5?) and forbids eunuchs from entering the congregation. I see no explicit verse against miscegenation (which I have mixed feelings about and am supposed to support in this culture), but I believe it is pretty-close-to-wrong because Abraham told his son not to marry a Canaanite and Moses forbade half-breeds (mamzers) from entering the congregation. My father views race as a legitimate consideration in marriage, but not as a single reason to rule it out. As intelligent and wise of a man as my father is, I think he is a bit inconsistent in that he says that child marriage is wrong and that I should marry a girl who dresses fairly modestly, but that a white man marrying a pygmy is not necessarily wrong. Most ten-year-old white girls are taller than most adult pygmies, who dress in a way almost all of us consider lewd. But that’s alright–I’m not marrying a pygmy anyway.