Christianity as a Necessary Foundation for White Nationalism, Part 1: Morality

Introduction

Many today in opposition to worldwide white dispossession have become quite disenchanted with the modern Christian church, and understandably so. The church has become a vestige of what it once was—siding entirely with antichrists, affirming views on race identical to MTV’s and Hollywood’s. Having witnessed this mass apostasy, it can be very tempting to think that a religion which abets such inordinate injustice is simply false; it can be very tempting to dispense with Christianity altogether. If one is well aware that resistance to Zionism and racial egalitarianism is the unpardonable sin according to the zeitgeist, then the prospect of non-Christian white nationalism, whether of the pagan or the atheist/agnostic variety, appears viable and even necessary.

But this is indeed only an appearance and a temptation. While the Christian church’s opposition to today’s wicked milieu is entirely embarrassing, Christian principles are still fundamental to ultimately overthrow it. The condition of biblical religion has been the direct target of attack in our nations, in which case rejecting it would be complicit with the aims of our intruders. It is important to realize just how indispensable the Christian religion is for supporting our peoples.

Moral Universalism

One Christian tenet thought to have wreaked havoc on whites might be called “moral universalism.”¹ Certain non-Christian white nationalists contend that whites’ exclusive insistence on their moral obligations to aid other racial groups has degenerated into a suicidal impulse, an ugly branch which spawns from the problematic root of moral universalism. Some might even appeal to the example of Jewish people, whose ethical deliberation predicates itself upon one fundamental question of moral particularism: “How does this help our people?” They are a clear example of a people who will not suffer extinction, since they do not allow themselves to place alien interests above their own. Some non-Christian white nationalists maintain that whites ought to do likewise, rather than care so much about moral abstractions.

Such a description grossly distorts the issue. It is one thing to affirm the universality of moral obligations, and it is another to affirm that the content of those moral obligations requires ethnomasochism and the exaltation of foreign interests. It is one thing to claim that moral principles apply universally; another to claim that these principles apply without regard for any distinction between “us” and “them.” One of the crucial points taught in Faith and Heritage is that we—and not just we, but all people—have augmented obligations to our own families, tribes, nations, and races. This principle of concentric loyalties entails the increased investment of time, energy, and capital in our own people’s interests—and that for everyone, universally. If whites adhered to these principles of fundamental morality, then we would not face the problems we currently do. The problem therefore lies not in a misconception of morality as universal, but in the misconstrual of the content of morality to omit our obvious obligations towards our own (1 Timothy 5:8).

In fact, arguing in the opposite direction, just what are moral obligations, if not universal? To say that someone is morally obligated to a particular course of action is to imply that anyone else in the same circumstances ought to do the same thing; otherwise moral advice and moral reasoning would be nonsensical. To reject moral “universalism” is therefore to reject morality itself, undermining our own moral objections to the dispossession and suicide of European-derived peoples. And if we reject moral universalism, we not only forfeit our moral objections to our dispossession and make complete nonsense out of morality, but also mock and trample upon God and His universally binding law.

Even further, given that a central problem for our people is not merely the attack from without, but the ethical decay from within, the idea that we ought to reject morality in order to save white people from their incredible moral degradation is, frankly, insane. Moral excellence is required in any pro-white movement that would successfully resist the established power and propaganda of our adversaries, but derogating moral universalism is a surefire way to make a movement care nothing for morality, and so utterly fail at achieving moral excellence. If we cannot win when white nationalists are dissolute or promiscuous in their personal lives, then we also cannot win when we employ a quasi-Jewish moral particularist framework. A firm commitment to Christian moral universality is, consequently, a necessary foundation.

Shifting Moral Standards

An unbelieving white nationalist might concede the universality of moral obligations while nevertheless denying that Christianity can consistently claim them. In Gregory Hood’s recent article (as referenced here at F&H), he laments Christianity’s modern role both in promoting human rights, egalitarianism, and nonjudgmentalism and in rejecting the “‘unchosen’ loyalties of kin and country.” He is certainly correct to lament this. The visible church, those who profess Christ and form institutions in His name, has largely apostatized and bowed the knee before Equality within the last century. We have rejected the historic Christian virtues of patriotism, chastity, and dignity, denouncing them as racist, sexist, homophobic, and the like. This apostasy from the heights of Western Christian civilization to the cesspool where we now reside knows no precursor of equal magnitude in church history.

But apostasy presupposes an original position of honor and principle from which one has fallen. It presupposes that the religious principles of our former civilization have been denied, rather than carried to their full fruition. Mr. Hood can claim that the devolution from our civilizational zenith to our multicultural sewer is a “natural” one, given the principles of Christianity, but that is an entirely separate argument to make and cannot depend solely on the historical fact that the formerly Christian West has embraced cultural Marxism. (Nor can it depend on Mr. Hood’s vague rhetoric regarding justification by faith and other Christian doctrines, which rhetoric betrays an awful misunderstanding of the faith.) Besides, Matt Parrott has already identified Mr. Hood’s foolish contradiction: claiming simultaneously that “Christianity properly understood does not demand egalitarianism” and that the Eastern Orthodox, upon reading their Bibles, will finally apprehend its true teachings of equality and multiracial suicide. He wishes to claim both that true Christianity teaches against the zeitgeist (perhaps because this shields him from pro-Christian criticisms among white nationalists) and that true Christianity supports it.

Mr. Hood thus has no grounds to claim that the previous century’s apostasy from biblical truth is due to a Christian God whose character “smoothly modifies itself to fit modern moral standards.” His claim requires far more argument and a much more informed understanding of Christian ethics. Such a claim must upend, not only Mr. Hood’s own claim that the Bible opposes egalitarianism, but also all the ink spilled in Christendom defending the hierarchical implications of a Christian social order. We at Faith and Heritage are glad to have added to that collection, and we encourage Mr. Hood to learn more here about the national and racial implications of true Christianity.

God as Moral Lawgiver

Leaving aside for now the misconstruals of particular Christian moral teachings, it is important to consider the nature of morality in a more abstract way. Above, I discussed and established morality’s universality. But when I mention the union between morality and Christianity, I do not intend to posit a merely accidental connection. It is not only the case that moral universality is a tenet which Christians affirm, but even further, morality itself requires Christianity. The very notion of a moral obligation presupposes a moral authority who can dispense commands unto subjects (and impose penalties). For instance, to say that I ought not murder presupposes that someone else has bound me unto that course of action. Of course, someone might object that this is entirely arbitrary and unproven. He might even give a counterexample: “If I want to be good at this sport, then I ought to practice it often”—and this sense of “ought” clearly does not presuppose an authoritative lawgiver. But moral obligations involve a different kind of ought-statement than this sports one; moral obligations involve what might be called unqualified or unconditional obligations. The sports example carries the introductory phrase, “if I want to be good at this sport…”; and the “obligation” or “oughtness” to practice the sport often is seen as the means to fulfill the end marked out by the introductory phrase, namely, to be good at the sport. Many types of non-moral ought-statements can be made along these lines: if I want to do X, then I ought to do Y—since X is the end and Y is the means.

What is so different about morality, however, is that it involves this unqualified or unconditional feature: our moral obligation not to murder can be expressed in the statement, “We ought not to murder, period.” It is true that our refusal to murder others can have certain purposes to it—for example, we can choose not to murder because not doing so alleviates human suffering, or because not doing so glorifies God—but nonetheless, the obligation persists irrespective of the agent’s aim for those purposes. It is not as if “I ought not to murder” is true only if I value a certain purpose which can be achieved by my not-murdering. Rather, “I ought not to murder” is true without any qualification or conditionality. These obligations just exist for us as rational and moral beings; a plain fact of our existence is that we ought to do certain actions and refrain from certain actions. And it is this type of obligation which requires an authoritative Lawgiver. Without such a Lawgiver, there could be no real, binding obligations, only a fleeting sense of them.²

It is because of this unique quality of moral duties that certain atheistic philosophers flatly reject them as exceedingly strange. J.L. Mackie, for example, even argues that because moral obligations are so bizarre, we therefore lack sufficient reason to believe they exist. According to him, “If there were objective [ethical] values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”³ Many other atheists also argue that morality is relative and ultimately a matter of preference, rather than affirming any genuine obligations to certain courses of action. Contra Mackie and the consistent atheist, the Christian—along with any other sensible and honest mind—affirms that morality is real, and that there really is an objective moral transgression when, say, a black man rapes and slays a white girl.

But if objective morality is granted, then these “odd” unqualified obligations exist and thereby stand in need of explanation. The most plausible explanation, if not the only possible one, is that they emerge from the commands of an authoritative Lawgiver. Other theories might explain our sense of moral duty (e.g. that we have evolved with these feelings in order to better propagate offspring), but no other explanation can ground the reality of duty. There must be an original, uncreated moral Authority who binds us unto the moral law which we, as to its basic principles, clearly apprehend by conscience. The Lord, of course, is this moral Lawgiver (Isaiah 33:22).

One might object that the nature of moral obligations entails only theism, not Christianity as a whole; but I am not presently interested in providing a comprehensive Christian apologetic. Suffice it to say that the nature of morality leaves us only with the revealed monotheistic religions and deism as our candidates, among which Christianity is clearly the superior. Pre-Christian European paganism and full-bore atheism or agnosticism are capable neither to defend morality nor to defend our people. Besides Christ, all other ground is sinking sand.

Conclusion

Although the altruism which characterizes the white race has been perverted into anti-white suicidal tendencies—and not without Jewish influence—it would be wrongheaded to transfer the blame to the nature of morality itself. Such an accusation is in practice leveled at the Giver of that law, which is immoral and even blasphemous.

Equally blasphemous are the plans of white nationalists who deny God as the uncreated moral authority but still believe the well-being of white people to be their ultimate purpose. Any non-theistic or non-universalist conception of morality requires one to view some lesser created entity—in this case, white people—as ultimate, and so practically as God. This conception of morality is monstrous to reason, to conscience, and to faith. I would certainly not desire these men to be consistently nihilistic in their rejection of moral universality, but rather pray that they see their error and repent for their sins. White nationalists need to affirm the only morality there is: universal morality, with the Christian God back of it.

 

Read Part 2: The Glory of God

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